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INTRODUCTION
The American judiciary is suffering from a terrible affliction: bi
ased judges. I am not talking about the subconscious or unconscious
biases-stemming from different backgrounds, experiences, ideolo
gies, etc.-that everyone, including judges, harbors. 1 Rather, I am
describing invidious, improper biases that lead judges to favor one
litigant over another for reasons that almost everyone would agree
should play no role in judicial decision-making: the desire to repay a
debt of gratitude to those who helped the judge get elected and be re
elected. 2
The bias problem is pervasive and affects more than just a few
bad apples. Almost ninety percent of state court judges must face elec

* Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law.
I. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L.
REv. 493, 497 (2013) ("Judges have long been characterized as human beings subject
to human prejudices.... If perfect impartiality is unattainable, the more pragmatic
objective is to ensure that judges are 'impartial enough' to fulfill the role assigned
them under state and federal constitutions: to uphold the rule of law."). The view that
judges act as mere umpires, without allowing any preconceptions to shape their deci
sions, has largely been discredited. See, e.g., Theodore A. McKee, Judges as
Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1709 (2007) (discussing Chief Justice Roberts's use of
the metaphor during his confirmation hearing).
2. These biases and the reasons for their existence are discussed infra Part I.
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tion to obtain or retain their office. 3 These judges are not low-level
bureaucrats handling the administration of parking tickets; rather, they
handle the most important issues that arise in our legal system, like
constitutional rights, 4 voting rights, 5 and criminal law. 6 Our entire le
gal system depends on judges who decide cases according to the law.
As judges and scholars have often recognized, an impartial judiciary is
at the core of the American justice system and is one of the central
pillars of a constitutional democracy. 7
Judicial elections themselves are nothing new, having been
around for over 150 years. 8 For at least three decades, we have sus
pected that elected judges are biased judges. 9 Recent empirical evi
dence of judicial bias has overwhelmingly confirmed our worst fears,
and study after study has shown that elected judges systematically
favor certain groups (contributors, in-state litigants, or groups taking a
popular political position, for example) while disfavoring others (in
particular, out-of-state litigants, criminal defendants, and litigants ar
guing unpopular political positions). 10 These biases have been exacer
bated by a major transformation in judicial elections themselves,
3. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States' Judicial Selection, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1077, 1105 app. 2 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977)
(discussing state court enforcement of federal constitutional rights).
5. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69
(2009) (highlighting extensive litigation involving issues of election administration
and voting rights in state courts).
6. See, e.g., Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: "Tough on Crime," Soft on
Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 317 (2010).
7. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (discussing the importance
of a fair trial in a fair tribunal); J. Thomas Greene, The Rule of !Aw-Endangered?,
225 F.R.D. 29, 29 (2004) ("[A] fundamental hallmark of the Rule of Law is that our
system of rights, remedies and procedures is to be administered by an independent and
impartial judiciary.").
8. The most thorough history of judicial elections, including the reasons for their
adoption, is JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, Tm~ PEOPLE'S COURTS: PURSUING Jurn
CIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012). Shugerman explains that judicial elections
became popular in the 1850s when a financial crisis led voters to conclude that judges
should be more independent of state legislatures. Id. at 123-43. But see Jona Gold
schmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L.
REv. I, 5-6 (1994) (suggesting that judicial elections were part of the Jacksonian
movement toward more democratic institutions).
9. The concerns about the impartiality of elected judges began to grow especially
in the 1980s as judicial elections started to evolve. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, Note,
Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN.
L. REv. 449, 465 n.87 (1988) (discussing concerns about biased elected judges); Mark
Andrew Grannis, Note, Safeguarding the Litigant's Constitutional Right to a Fair and

Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial
Campaign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 M1cH. L. REV. 382 (1987).
10. See infra Part I for a discussion of that evidence.
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which have gone from "sleepy" and "low-key" to "wild" and
"politicized" in a span of a couple decades. 11 This means that our
debates about judicial bias will only intensify as judicial elections
continue to evolve. 12
If we accept the overwhelming evidence of judicial bias-and I
believe we have no other choice given its sheer volume-we are left
with an important question: how well does our approach to judicial
bias address the problem? Generally, recusal has been our primary
solution to concerns about partial judges. If a judge is biased or if
there is so much as an appearance of bias, the judge must recuse him
self from the case. 13 Recusal is the solution offered by the state and
federal recusal statutes, state codes of judicial conduct, and even by
the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in recent cases involving judi
cial elections, including Republican Party ofMinnesota v. White 14 and
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 15 As we commemorate the five
year anniversary of the Caperton decision, it is a good time to evalu
ate whether recusal has worked (and can work) to eliminate election
related judicial bias. In this Article, I argue that recusal alone has not
only failed to ensure judicial impartiality, but also is an inadequate
solution to the problem of judicial bias.
Part I of this Article will explain how three fundamental changes
in the nature of judicial elections have created a major concern about
judicial bias. The first is the spending explosion in judicial races. 16
Modern judicial elections require judges to raise significant amounts
of money to get elected or re-elected. Who gives judges that money?
Frequently, it is the very litigants and lawyers who are most likely to
11. See Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REv.
699, 723-24 (2013) ("Although judicial elections have traditionally been assumed to
be sleepy, uncompetitive, and low-profile events ... many recent judicial elections
have been highly visible and effective methods for influencing policy, mobilizing is
sue advocacy, and unseating judges.").
12. See David Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 CoLUM. L. REV. 265
(2008).
13. For federal judges, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2013) requires recusal whenever the
judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." State court judges are gov
erned by codes of judicial conduct that use similar, if not identical, language. See
MODEL CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.l 1(A) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2011); see also John
Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237,
238 (1987) ("Courts declare that impartiality is so important that a reasonable-albeit
incorrect-appearance of bias compels recusal ....").
14. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
15. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
16. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations of Judicial
Campaign Finance, 86 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1248 (2013) ("With the increase in
competitiveness of judicial elections, campaign spending has skyrocketed.").

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy

634

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18:631

appear in front of those judges when they take the bench. 17 As a result,
judges frequently hear cases where at least one of the parties or one of
the lawyers either contributed to the judge's campaign or made an
independent expenditure to support the judge's campaign. 18 In addi
tion, judges who want to keep their jobs will have to raise more
money in the future, likely forcing them to consider how their deci
sions will be perceived by their donors and special interest groups. 19
The second cause of judicial bias stems from the promises that
judges make on the campaign trail. The Supreme Court in White held
that judicial candidates have a First Amendment right to announce
their views on controversial legal issues. 2° Following this decision,
special interest groups now often send judicial candidates question
naires asking them to take positions on issues important to those
groups. 21 As a result, judges frequently exercise that First Amendment
right, and so they come into office with promises to keep. 22 A failure
to keep those promises can have costly consequences in a future judi
17. See Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and Democratic
Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 474 (2002)
("Often, lawyers or litigants who are likely to appear before the judge constitute large
proportions of the contributions to judicial candidates.").
18. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 990 (7th Cir. 2010) ("It is an unfortunate
reality of judicial elections that judicial campaigns are often largely funded by law
yers, many of whom will appear before the candidate who wins."). Unfortunately, we
do not have adequate state-by-state data from every state to know precisely how often
this happens. A recent American Judicature Society study of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania found that in sixty percent of cases, at least one of the litigants or law
yers had contributed to the campaign of at least one justice. See Shira J. Goodman et
al., What's More Important: Electing Judges or Judicial Independence? It's Time for
Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial Independence, 48 DuQ. L. REV. 859, 865 (2010).
19. One study has shown that state supreme court justices have "routinely ad
just[ed] their rulings to attract votes and campaign money." See Joanna M. Shepherd,
Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DuKE L.J. 623, 625 (2009).
20. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-78 (2002).
21. Goodman et al., supra note 18, at 869-70 (discussing the extensive use of ques
tionnaires "seeking clear pronouncements of candidates' positions on controversial
issues that often are the subject of litigation in the state courts").
22. Admittedly, the Court's decision in White only applied to "announcements," not
"promises." White, 536 U.S. at 780. But as Justice Ginsburg explained in her dissent:
Uncoupled from the Announce Clause, the ban on pledges or
promises is easily circumvented. By prefacing a campaign commitment
with the caveat, "although I cannot promise anything," or by simply
avoiding the language of promises or pledges altogether, a candidate
could declare with impunity how she would decide specific issues.
Id. at 819 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also George D. Brown, Political Judges and
Popular Justice: A Conservative Victory or a Conservative Dilemma?, 49 WM. &
MARYL. REY. 1543, 1598-99 (2008) ("After White, candidates can make pledges or
promises by labeling them as announcements of views, even though the two are func
tionally similar."). And some scholars have speculated that the ABA's commitments
and promise clauses are also likely to be struck down by the Supreme Court. See
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cial election. These are rarely rule-of-law promises-to uphold the
law, to act impartially, to be fair and just. No, the promises that the
public seeks, and that judges make, are promises to be tough on crime,
to restrict (or protect) abortion rights, to take on (or stand with) plain
tiffs' lawyers. 23
Finally, as judicial elections become more contested, judges feel
increasing pressure to decide cases in accordance with public, as well
as donor, preferences. This leads to bias against unpopular litigants
and unpopular causes. 24 This problem-termed "the majoritarian dif
ficulty"25-is perhaps the most troubling for the justice system and
the rule of law. When judges are forced to consider how a particular
decision will affect the judge's own job prospects, judges may no
longer act impartially.26
In Part II of this Article, I discuss the promise of recusal as a
solution to the judicial bias problem. Recusal is our tool of choice
when it comes to addressing judicial bias; it is at the heart of state and
federal rules of judicial conduct, as well as statutes regulating judicial
bias. 27 It is the tool that was offered by Supreme Court in Caperton,
and scholars and judges have written extensively about recusal. 28 Part
Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the Re
sponse to Judicial Campaign Speech, !04 CoLUM. L. REV. 563, 607-08 (2004).
23. See Swisher, supra note 6, at 319-38 (discussing the incentives for judges to
appear "tough on crime"); see also Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Coun
tering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REv. 719, 734 (2010); Polly Simpson &
Sally Weaver, Judicial Elections: Pollsters Want to Seat Far-Right Ideologues, AT
LANTA J.-CoNsT., July 16, 2004, at A 13 (discussing the use of questionnaires to publi
cize candidates' view on divisive social issues, including abortion, homosexuality,
and school prayer).
24. The most unpopular litigants are generally criminal defendants and out-of-state
litigants. The causes that are unpopular depend on the state. These can be traditionally
liberal or traditionally conservative causes, ranging from abortion rights to voting
rights to tort reform. See infra Part I.
25. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 689 (1995) (coining the term to describe the lack of
independence and impartiality that elected judges suffer from because of the need to
satisfy the electorate to obtain and retain their jobs).
26. Grannis, supra note 9, at 418 ("[I]t may be that the best way to preserve the
impartiality of elected judges is not to elect them.").
27. In fact, there are at least three federal statutes that regulate judicial disqualifica
tion. 28 U.S.C. §§ 47, 144, 455 (2013). These statutes have been discussed exten
sively in the literature, and I will only mention them in this Article in passing. Most
states have also adopted recusal statutes. See Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appear
ances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531,
538 n.24 (2005).
28. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 27; Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Jus
tice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2007).
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II will briefly discuss the recusal standards and practices in the states
that elect judges.
In Part ID, I conclude that recusal has failed to prevent biased
judges from rendering judicial decisions. Indeed, I suggest that recusal
cannot serve as the solution to the problem of biased judges. Part of
the reason is that in most jurisdictions, it is the judge herself who must
decide whether to recuse. It is foolhardy to put the recusal power in
the hands of those most likely to be biased. But putting aside the pro
cedural concern, recusal suffers from another fatal flaw. All elected
judges must contend with the majoritarian difficulty outlined above
and must worry about how their decisions will be 'perceived by the
voters in the next election. That means that whoever replaces the re
cused judge will necessarily be subject to the same majoritarian pres
sures.29 Admittedly, recusal done right could eliminate the bias toward
or against the immediate litigants, but even a perfectly implemented
recusal procedure fails to account for the majoritarian difficulty
altogether.
I conclude with some thoughts on where we can go from here
and discussion of whether there are other potential solutions to the
problem of judicial bias.
I.
THE BIAS PROBLEM

A.

Sources of Bias

Although judicial elections 30 have been a part of our legal land
scape for over 150 years, today's judicial elections look very little like
their early predecessors. For decades, judicial elections were "sleepy"
and "low-key" 31 : Turnout and salience were low, while roll-off3 2 and
29. Of course, if a state could ensure that the recused judge is replaced with a judge
approaching retirement-or perhaps a judge who promises not to run for reelection
this concern would be obviated. However, this is unlikely to be a workable solution,
for it is unlikely that enough judges will be nearing retirement to handle any state's
overcrowded docket.
30. There are three kinds of judicial elections: partisan, non-partisan, and retention.
Much has been written about these elections. See generally SHUGERMAN, supra note
8, at 267-69. The differences are irrelevant to this article, as all three forms of judicial
elections suffer from similar defects. This is also likely to become truer as retention
elections become more competitive and incumbent candidates continue to suffer
defeats as they have done in the past few years. See Pozen, supra note 12 (describing
ways in which retention elections have become more competitive).
31. SHUGERMAN, supra note 8, at 241; see also Richard Briffault, Public Funds and
the Regulation of Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REv. 819, 819 (2002) (explaining
that judicial elections "were once low-key affairs, conducted with civility and dig
nity"); David Schultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Future of State
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incumbent retention rates were high. 33 Today, judicial elections look
very much like elections for legislative and executive offices: spend
ing and salience are high, while incumbent retention rates have
dropped. As a result of these changes, judicial elections have been
described as either "nightmarish" or "healthy," depending on the au
thor's point of view. 34 These races are often very competitive, with
substantial spending by the candidates and their supporters. Although
the elections have been transformed in a number of different ways,
there are three key changes I will highlight in this Part. These three
changes, I argue, are the most important sources of increased judicial
bias.

1.

The Corrupting Influence of Money

The first bias-inducing change to judicial elections has to do with
the explosion of money in judicial races. Money was not a major part
of older judicial elections, and the elections were relatively inexpen
sive, meaning that judges did not need to fundraise. 35 With few people
contributing money to either sitting judges running for re-election or
candidates for office, judges were less likely to hear cases involving
contributors. There was little television advertising, which kept ex
penses down. 36 Independent expenditures were also less common. 37
And because judges often ran unopposed, 38 there was little need for
sitting judges to spend their own money on their campaigns.
Judicial Selection, 69 ALB. L. REv. 985, 985 (2006) ("Judicial selection is a histori
cally sleepy affair ....").
32. Roll-off happens when voters cast their ballots for other races but fail to do so
in a judicial race on the same ballot. See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and
Judicial Independence: The Voter's Perspective, 64 Omo ST. L.J. 13, 19-20 (2003).
33. Pozen, supra note 12, at 297 (discussing the historic pattern of high retention
rates in judicial elections). As discussed infra, this pattern seems to be changing.
34. Id. at 317 (discussing the notion that judicial elections are becoming "healthier
than ever on many standard indices"); Schultz, supra note 31, at 985 ("[J]udicial elec
tions may look increasingly more nightmarish ....").
35. SHUGERMAN, supra note 8, at 10 (describing earlier judicial election campaigns
as "relatively inexpensive").
36. Today, television advertising is one of the most expensive components of a
judicial election campaign. See Jordan M. Singer, Knowing ls Half the Battle: A Pro
posal for Prospective Performance Evaluations in Judicial Elections, 29 U. ARK. LIT
TLE RocK L. REv. 725, 731 (2007) ("In 2004, more than $24 million was spent on
television ads in highest court races-one-fourth of all dollars raised by the
candidates.").
37. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973,
977-78 (2001) (discussing the increases in campaign expenditures); Pozen, supra
note 12, at 306 (arguing that "campaigns have become more expensive and
competitive").
38. Pozen, supra note 12, at 267 ("Many incumbents ran unopposed.").
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Today, these elections are very expensive. We have gone from
spending almost nothing on judicial elections to spending approxi
mately $83.3 million between 1990 and 1999, up to $206.9 million
from 2000 to 2009. 39 Seemingly, records for the amounts of money
being raised and spent are broken every new election cycle.40 As a
result of this transformation, judges spend significant amounts of time
and energy raising money. Certainly, a reelection campaign is no
longer a one-person endeavor. 41
This rise in spending has significant implications for judicial im
partiality. Because there are now many contributors and spenders,
judges frequently hear cases involving parties (or attorneys) who
helped them get elected. 42 For example, a recent Pennsylvania study
showed that nearly two-thirds of cases heard by the state supreme
court in 2008 and 2009 involved at least one party, lawyer, or law firm
that contributed to the campaign of at least one of the justices. 43 This
should come as no surprise, as it is precisely the parties that are most
likely to appear in front of a judge who have the most interest in cur
rying the judge's favor with campaign contributions or independent
expenditures. 44
39. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDI
CIAL ELECTIONS 2000-2009: DECADE OF CHANGE I, 8 (2010), http://www.brennan
center.org/sites/default/files/legacy/JAS-NPJE-Decade-ONLINE.pdf.
40. See Singer, supra note 36, at 730-3 I (discussing record-breaking campaigns in
judicial elections throughout the United States).
41. See Pozen, supra note 12, at 306 (explaining that "the time drain of campaign
ing has, one assumes, become more pressing in recent years").
42. See Carrington & Long, supra note 17, at 474. A New York Times study
showed that Supreme Court of Ohio justices routinely heard cases involving parties or
amici who gave them campaign contributions. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Cam
paign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. I, 2006, at Al. Public
confidence in judicial impartiality has also suffered as a result. In an important study
by Justice at Stake, eighty-six percent of those surveyed expressed concern that "law
yers are the biggest campaign contributors to judicial candidates, and they often ap
pear in court before judges they've given money to." GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER
RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE & AM. VIEWPOINT, JUSTICE AT STAKE FREQUENCY
QUESTIONNAIRE 8 (2001 ), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/J ASN ationalSur
veyResults_6F537F9927204.pdf.
43. Malia Reddick & James R. DeBuse, Campaign Contributors and the Penn
sylvania Supreme Court, 93 JUDICATURE 164 (2010). Other surveys have concluded
that in many states, "nearly half of all supreme court cases involve someone who has
given money to one or more of the judges hearing the case." James Sample, Democ
racy at the Comer of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and Equal
ity, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727, 749 (2011).
44. In Caperton, the Court appeared to recognize that the independent expenditures,
like direct contributions, by one of the litigants to help a judge's campaign could
create an intolerable probability of bias; in fact, the Court repeatedly referred to the
independent expenditures in the case as "contributions." Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884-86 (2009). This blurring surprised election law scholars
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Caperton is the prototypical example. When it came time to elect
a justice to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, Don
Blankenship, whose company is a frequent litigant in front of that
court, was the biggest spender in the judicial election. And despite
Justice Kennedy's repeated claims that Caperton is unique, extreme,
and unusual, that is simply not the case. In fact, the Caperton situation
is quite common. 45 And it is no stretch to believe that a judge hearing
a case involving a contributor would feel a debt of gratitude toward
that individual-indeed, to feel otherwise would defy bedrock social
norms. 46 In addition, with the next election always just around the
corner, 47 an elected judge must always be thinking about whether the
because the Court, since Buckley v. Valeo, had sustained a bright-line distinction be
tween independent expenditures and contributions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I,
79 (1976) (recognizing a constitutionally significant difference between independent
expenditures and direct campaign contributions). Although the Caperton Court does
not expressly recognize that independent expenditures in judicial elections are inher
ently corrupting in the sense that they could be banned consistent with the First
Amendment, the Court appears to acknowledge that "there are circumstances in which
independent expenditures have the same potential to corruptly influence the actions of
elected officials as contributions." Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REv.
1644, 1656 (2012).
45. For example, just a few years earlier, the Illinois Supreme Court heard Avery v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005). Avery was
an appeal of a one-billion-dollar verdict against State Farm. While the case was pend
ing, Illinois held its election for a seat on the state supreme court. The candidates for
that seat received a record $9.3 million in campaign contributions. JAMES SAMPLE ET
AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS: SETnNG RECUSAL STANDARDS 20-23
(2008). Lloyd Karmeier won the election, having received hundreds of thousands of
dollars in contributions from State Farm employees and lawyers. See Hale v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 12-0660-DRH, 2013 WL 1287054, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Mar.
28, 2013). He then cast the deciding vote to overturn the verdict against State Farm.
Id. The United States Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. Two other
incidents involving the Ohio Supreme Court and the Michigan Supreme Court are
described by Roy Schotland in Comment on Professor Carrington's Article "The In
dependence and Democratic Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio," 30 CAP.
U. L. REV. 489, 493-94 (2002).
46. See Thomas M. Susman, Reciprocity, Denial, and the Appearance of Impropri
ety: Why Self-Recusal Cannot Remedy the Influence of Campaign Contributions on
Judges' Decisions, 26 J.L. & PoL. 359, 366 (2011) (discussing the "reciprocity princi
ple," which is the notion that once an individual benefits from an action of another it
is expected that the recipient of the benefit return the favor). The Supreme Court cited
this commonsense intuition in Caperton. See 556 U.S. at 882 ("Though not a bribe or
criminal influence, Justice Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to
Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected.").
47. Elected state court judges generally serve shorter terms than appointed judges.
This is particularly true of lower state court judges, who typically serve relatively
short terms of four to eight years. See Roy A. Schotland, Republican Party of Minne
sota v. White: Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?, 41 JunGEs' J. 7, 10 (2002)
(discussing the effect of short terms for judges on judicial independence). For an ex
cellent discussion on the interrelationship between judicial independence, accountabil-
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same contributor would support his or her next election bid, which is
likely to be more expensive given the trend in spending in judicial
elections.
2.

Broken Promises

The second bias-inducing transformation of judicial elections has
to do with the evolution of judicial campaigns and the candidates'
conduct during those campaigns. In pre-1980s judicial elections,
judges were seldom seen and even more seldom heard, rarely appear
ing on the campaign trail. 48 Because the public rarely paid attention to
judicial elections, there was simply no need to discuss any substantive
legal issues. 49
Even judges who wanted to campaign were very limited in what
they could say on the campaign trail. Ethics codes, as well as customs
and tradition, prevented judges from speaking out on substantive is
sues that would likely need to be resolved by the judiciary.50 That all
changed with Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. There, the Su
preme Court struck down a portion of Minnesota's Code of Judicial
Conduct that prohibited judges from announcing their views on issues
that were likely to arise in front of the Court. 51 The First Amendment,
Justice Scalia explained, does not allow a state to impose such a broad
restriction on a candidate's speech. 52 If a state chooses to select its
ity, and the length of judicial terms, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of
Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEo. L.J.
1349 (2010).
48. Pozen, supra note 12, at 297 (describing how "[c]ampaigning was minimal[,]
incumbents almost always won[, and] few people voted or cared" in judicial elections
of the past).
49. Id.
50. Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States Are Responding to
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections Are Changing,
38 AKRON L. REv. 625, 629-32 (2005) (discussing the regulation of judicial cam
paign speech before the Supreme Court's decision in White).
51. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
52. Id. Although the challenge in White concerned only the "announce clause" of
the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, similar challenges to other restrictions on
judicial candidate speech are being heard by the lower courts, including pledges or
promises clauses (banning "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office"), commit clauses (ban
ning "statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases,
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court"), and misrepresent
clauses (banning judicial candidates from knowingly misrepresenting facts concerning
themselves or an opponent). See, e.g., Pa. Family Inst. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156 (3d Cir.
2007) (concerning a challenge to a "pledges or promises clause" set forth in Penn
sylvania's judicial ethics rules); Winter v. Wolnitzek, 56 F. Supp. 3d 884 (E.D. Ky.
2014) (prohibition on misleading statements and misrepresentations); Carey v.
Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36-KKC, 2012 WL 4597236 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 2012) (commit
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judges by elections, candidates for the judicial office must have the
right to announce their positions during the campaign. 53
As a result, judges frequently take office having expressed their
position on a number of controversial issues. In part, they do so be
cause special interest groups frequently send judicial candidates ques
tionnaires seeking their views on whatever issues are of interest to
those particular groups. 54 Voters now expect judicial candidates to
take positions on issues that they will face. 55 For example, because
criminal law issues are so salient in judicial campaigns, many judges
have promised to be tough on crime. 56
Why might this be problematic? As the dissenters in White ex
plained, a judge taking office having made certain promises to the
electorate-or even simply having announced her views on controver
sial issues that are likely to arise-might feel undue pressure to live up
to those promises. 57 Although there are no studies demonstrating a
conclusive link between statements made during judicial campaigns
and judicial decisions in office, common sense and human nature sug
gest that judges consider the promises they have made in deciding
cases. 58 As California's former Chief Justice Ronald George ex
plained, "When a candidate for judicial office speaks during an elec
tion campaign about his or her views on issues that may come before
the court, voters reasonably will anticipate that he or she will render
clause). The Supreme Court recently upheld Florida's ban on direct solicitation by
judges. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
53. Of course, a state is not required to elect its judges, and there are a variety of
modes of election or appointment adopted by the states for different judgeships. See
Am. Bar Ass'n, Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckdam.
pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
54. Frost & Lindquist, supra note 23, at 734.
55. See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Navigating the Path of the Supreme Appoint
ment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 537, 577 (2011) ("[V]oters now expect state judicial
candidates to express their views on topics such as gay and lesbian rights, abortion
rights, school prayer, and religious displays.").
56. See Swisher, supra note 6, at 327-38.
57. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
The dissenters point out that the concern about appearance of impartiality is the rea
son why Supreme Court Justices rarely make any substantive comments in the course
of their confirmation hearings, even though they do not have to face confirmation
again. Id. at 800, 807 n.l.
58. It is not unusual for a politician to be criticized heavily for breaking a campaign
promise. One of the most famous examples is George H.W. Bush's promise of "no
new taxes." See, e.g., Z. Bryan Wolf, Six Things Presidents Wish They Hadn't Said,
CNN (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/l l/02/politics/obama-read-my-lips
moment/.
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decisions in accordance with those personal views." 59 Left unsaid in
Chief Justice George's statement are the implications for judicial deci
sion-making: if voters expect a judge to rule in accordance with the
judge's campaign statements, the judge is likely to be concerned about
being perceived as breaking those promises. In other words, a judge
deciding a case involving an issue on which the judge campaigned
might be biased in favor of the previously announced views precisely
because of those earlier statements. 60
3.

The Majoritarian Difficulty

But there is an even greater concern. In an influential 1995 arti
cle, Professor Steven Croley coined the term "majoritarian diffi
culty ."61 The term refers to the idea that an elected judge hearing a
case would be tempted to decide the case according to the preferences
of the majority (i.e., the people who will decide whether the judge
remains in the job), even if doing so is contrary to the law. 62 Because
judges often have wide latitude in reaching legal decisions, it would
not be a willful misapplication of the law to "impose an undeservedly
harsh sentence on a criminal defendant or find an out-of-state corpora
tion liable to a class of state citizens, despite weak evidence of wrong
doing. "63 When a reading an ambiguous statute or interpreting a vague
constitutional provision, a judge may be tempted to choose a more
popular reading to appease the electorate. 64
59. Ronald M. George, Foreword: Achieving Impaniality in State Courts, 91 CA
L. REv. 1853, 1861 (2009). Chief Justice George criticizes the practice of an
nouncing views on controversial issues because "it may well be misleading for
candidates for judicial office to provide information concerning their individual views
during a campaign, because doing so in such a context suggests that the judge will
conform to those views regardless of the state of the law." Id. at 1862.
60. For a discussion of the obligation to keep promises, see generally CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT AS A PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 19
(1981); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 296 (1998).
61. Croley, supra note 25, at 693. The majoritarian difficulty is the counter to Alex
ander Bickel's famous countermajoritarian difficulty, which has been at the heart of
all constitutional theory. Id.; see also Barry Friedman, The Binh of an Academic
Obsession: The History of the Countennajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE
L.J. 153, 155 (2002).
62. Frost & Lindquist, supra note 23, at 731 ("[E]lective judiciaries pose a risk to
the rule of law, which is compromised whenever a judge's ruling is influenced by
majority preferences.").
63. Id. at 723.
64. Id. (hypothesizing that "elected judges will succumb to the pressure to decide
close cases as the majority of the electorate would prefer, rather than as the law re
quires"). Judges admit that such factors enter their decision-making. See Paul Rei
dinger, The Politics of Judging, 73 A.B.A. J. 52, 58 (1987). Justice Scalia once

LIF.
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But just as with money and promises, the majoritarian difficulty
was at one time only difficult in theory. Judicial elections historically
had such low salience that elected judges had little reason to tailor
their decisions to public opinion. Incumbents often ran unopposed,
and even when they faced a challenger, they almost always won. 65
Unlike elections for other elected offices, judges could feel safe in
their job, knowing that nobody was watching.
That has all changed in recent years. As judicial elections have
become more competitive, individual rulings face closer scrutiny and
pose a greater risk to a judges' careers. 66 As Justice Otto Klaus fa
mously remarked, "There's no way a judge is going to be able to ig
nore the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if he or
she has to make them near election time. That would be like ignoring
a crocodile in your bathtub."67 In recent years, a number of judges
have either lost elections as a result of unpopular decisions or
squeaked out narrow victories after unpopular decisions were used
against them by challengers. Recently, three justices of the Iowa Su
preme Court were voted out of office for their controversial decision
to strike down a state statute defining marriage as between a man and
a woman. 68 On average, of course, incumbents are still likely to win
their reelection, but the job is no longer safe for a sitting judge. 6 9 And
quipped that "[t]he first instinct of power is the retention of power." McConnell v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.).
65. David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 CoLUM.
L. REv. 2047, 2051 (2010) ("Under the traditional model of judicial elections ...
incumbents almost always won.").
66. See, e.g., Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections
("Sitting judges facing an imminent election ... know that every decision is poten
tially fodder for the opposition. When well-heeled or well-organized interest groups
can seize on isolated opinions-even well-reasoned decisions that have been joined
by a majority of other judges on the court-as the basis for attack ads in the next
campaign, it takes extraordinary integrity and real courage for a judge facing reelec
tion to support a ruling that plainly will be unpopular."), in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE
RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 73, 75
(Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007); Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins, Do Judicial Elections
Facilitate Popular Constitutionalism; Can They?, 11 I CoLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 27,
33 (2011) ("[P]ast judicial elections have taught that justices can be ousted due to
their vote in a single case on one of these topics, often a vote portrayed incorrectly or
deceptively by the opposition campaign or interest group.").
67. Reidinger, supra note 64, at 58.
68. See Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of
Three Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 715 (2011).
69. Some estimate the judicial election races are now at least as competitive as
races for the U.S. House of Representatives. See Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme
Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. PoL.
SCI. REv. 315, 319 (2001) ("The fact of the matter ... is that supreme court justices
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as judicial elections become more and more competitive, pressures to
impress the voting public at all costs will continue to increase.
B.

Evidence of Bias

So far, we have only shown that judicial elections-in particular,
the modern judicial elections characterized by high spending, more
substantive judicial campaigns, and greater levels of competition
create the potential for judicial bias. But perhaps judges can ignore
these temptations and act impartially once they reach the bench. After
all, in the words of Blackstone, "[t]he law will not suppose a possibil
ity of bias or favor in a judge, who is already sworn to administer
impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that pre
sumption and idea." 70 Testifying in support of Justice Alito's confir
mation to the United States Supreme Court, Third Circuit Judge
Edward Becker explained: "The public doesn't understand what hap
pens to you when you become a judge. When you take that judicial
oath, you become a different person." 71
As comforting as Judge Becker's testimony sounds, common
sense tells us it is Pollyannaish in the extreme. After all, judges are
human beings subject to the same temptations and influences as the
rest of us. 72 A number of recent studies have confirmed that this com
monsense intuition is indeed correct. On the whole, these studies show
that elected judges are biased, and these biases run precisely along the
lines we expected: in favor of the interests that can help judges be
reelected (e.g., donors) and against the interests that cannot (out-of
state parties). Certain disfavored litigants, including criminal defen
dants, fare poorly across a number of dimensions and across
jurisdictions.

face competition that is, by two of three measures, equivalent if not higher to that for
the U.S. House.").
70. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361.
71. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Asso
ciate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, I09th Cong. 655-56 (2006) (statement of Judge Edward Becker).
72. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 829
(2001) (demonstrating "that judges rely on the same cognitive decision-making pro
cess as laypersons and other experts, which leaves them vulnerable to cognitive illu
sions that can produce poor judgments"); Daniel Hinkle, Cynical Realism and Judicial
Fantasy, 5 WASH. U. JuR1s. REV. 289, 297 (2013) ("[J]udges are humans who are
subject to the same biases and flaws that all humans are susceptible of when making
decisions.").
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Perhaps most concerning, the studies show that judges over
whelmingly rule in favor of their campaign contributors. 73 Every dol
lar a litigant spends on a judicial election increases the likelihood that
the judge will rule in that litigant's favor.7 4 This is especially true if
one of the parties (or its lawyers) made a significant contribution to
the judge's campaign. 75 And even when both sides contributed to a
judge's campaign, the party that contributed more fares better. 76
The studies also show that judges are biased against out-of-state
defendants. One study showed that the average damages award was
$150,000 higher against out-of-state defendants. 77 Of course, this re
distribution of wealth to in-state litigants is entirely rational-taking
care of the local donors and voters takes priority. 78 In the words of
West Virginia Justice Richard Neely, "As long as I am allowed to
redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured in-state
plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. . . . [M]y job security [is en
hanced], because in-state plaintiffs, their families, and their friends
will reelect me." 79
If we tum our attention to criminal cases, the situation is no bet
ter. As judicial elections get closer, elected judges tend to sentence

73. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An
Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 69 (2011); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case
Study ofArbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2002); Margaret
S. Williams & Corey A. Ditslear, Bidding for Justice: The Influence of Attorneys'
Contributions on State Supreme Courts, 28 JusT. SYS. J. 135, 136 (2007) (concluding
that some Wisconsin judges tend to rule in favor of contributors); see also Liptak &
Roberts, supra note 42 (concluding that Supreme Court of Ohio justices ruled in favor
of their contributors more than seventy percent of the time).
74. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 73, at 73 ("We find that every dollar of contribu
tions from business groups is associated with increases in the probability that elected
judges will decide for business litigants.").
75. Aman McLeod, Bidding for Justice: A Case Study About the Effect of Cam
paign Contributions on Judicial Decision-Making, 85 U. Om. MERCY L. REV. 385,
386 (2008).
76. Vernon V. Palmer, The Recusal of American Judges in the Post-Caperton Era:
An Empirical Assessment of the Risk of Actual Bias in Decisions Involving Campaign
Contributors, 10 GLOBAL JURIST 3, 8 (2010).
77. Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of
Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 157, 163 (1999) (concluding that elected judges fre
quently redistribute wealth from out-of-state defendants to in-state plaintiffs).
78. Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial
Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 273, 289
(2002) (stating that an elected judge may rationally favor in-state plaintiffs, who vote
and have friends and relatives who vote, over out-of-state corporations).
79. RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS 4 (1988).
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criminal defendants more harshly. 80 And when that sentence is the
death penalty, an elected judge is much more likely to sentence a de
fendant to death when judicial elections are close. 81 One study found
that "criminal defendants [convicted of murder] were approximately
15% more likely to be sentenced to death when the sentence was is
sued during the judge's election year." 82 None of this comes as a sur
prise, as criminal justice issues figure prominently in contested
judicial elections. 8 3
And regardless of the type of case, empirical evidence seems to
support the intuition of the majoritarian difficulty. A number of stud
ies by Joanna Shepherd and others demonstrate that elected judges
tend to decide cases at least partly in accordance with the preference
of the electorate. 84 According to Shepherd, "[W]hen judges face [con
servative electorates] in partisan reelections, they are more likely to
[rule] for businesses over individuals, for employers in labor disputes,
for doctors and hospitals in medical malpractice cases, for businesses
in products liability cases, for original defendants in tort cases, and
against criminals in criminal appeals." 85 Admittedly, every judge
without life tenure must consider retention politics, 86 but elected
judges do it at a significantly higher level than appointed judges.
Finally, three relevant groups also believe that judicial decisions
are influenced by the election process. First, judges confirm that they
take electoral considerations into account when making legal judg
80. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: ls
Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. PoL. Set. 247, 258 (2004) (finding
that "all judges, even the most punitive, increase their sentences as reelection nears").
81. Richard W. Brooks & Steven Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The
Uneasy Relationship Between Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM.
L. & CRtMINOLOGY 609, 610 (2002) (explaining that "criminal defendants [convicted
of murder] were approximately 15% more likely to be sentenced to death when the
sentence was issued during the judge's election year").
82. Id.
83. See Croley, supra note 25, at 734-75 (1995) (citing an increase in the number
of elections where an incumbent judge loses because of criminal justice issues); cf
Kyle D. Cheek & Anthony Champagne, Partisan Judicial Elections: Lessons from a
Bellwether State, 39 W1LLAMETTE L. REV. 1357, 1365 (2003) (explaining that even
advocates of tort reform frequently pay for appeals to criminal justice issues because
those issues are more salient for voters).
84. Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges' Voting, 38
J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 169 (2009) ("The evidence supports the widespread belief that
judges respond to political pressure in an effort to be reelected ....").
85. Shepherd, supra note 19, at 661.
86. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J.
1589 (2009). In other words, even judges who are reappointed by the governor or the
state legislature seem to exhibit biases toward those reappointing agents.
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ments. 87 In one study, more than twenty-five percent of the respon
dents believed that contributions have at least "some influence" on
judicial decisions; approximately fifty percent thought the contribu
tions have at least "a little influence." 88 Second, the contributors be
lieve that their contributions make a difference. 89 And finally,
approximately eighty percent of the public thought that judges were
biased in favor of their contributors. 90 A similar percentage thought
that judicial decisions were influenced by political considerations. 91
While public, or even judicial, opinions do not alone prove that judges
are indeed biased, it shows that judicial elections create a strong ap
pearance of bias, and that in itself is a problem for the judiciary.92
II.
THE PROMISE OF RECUSAL

The substantial risk-not to mention empirical evidence-of ju
dicial bias stemming from elections is deeply troubling. The Supreme
Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires judges to be im
partial.93 In fact, all other rights and constitutional protections, as well
87. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior,
77 JUDICATURE 306, 312 (1994) (concluding that "[e]ven though judges rarely lose
retention elections and only 34.9 percent believe a poor judge will be voted out, still
three-fifths believe judicial retention elections have a pronounced effect on judicial
behavior"); Maura Anne Schoshinski, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent
Judiciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
839, 842 (1994) ("Judges admit that they cannot completely trust themselves to hold
in check the threats to their independence presented by judicial elections.").
88. GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH, INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE & AM.
VIEWPOINT, JUSTICE AT STAKE-STATE JUDGES FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 5
(2002 ), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/ems/JASJudgesS urvey Resul ts_EA
8838C0504A5.pdf.
89. ADAM SKAGGS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUYING JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF
CITIZENS UNITED ON JUDICIAL EI.EcnoNs 4-7 (2010), https://www.brennancenter.
org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/BCReportBuyingJustice.pdf?nocdn= 1 (sum
marizing evidence demonstrating that judicial campaign contributors believe that their
spending influences judicial decisions).
90. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 Omo ST. L.J. 43
(2003).
91. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CouRTS, How THE PUBLIC Vrnws THE STATE CoURTs:
A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 41 (1999), http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/243/
urlt/publicop_natl.pdf.
92. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 881 (8th Cir. 2001)
("The governmental interest in an independent and impartial judiciary is matched by
its equally important interest in preserving public confidence in that independence and
impartiality.").
93. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Ward v. Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (holding that a judge violates
due process when he has a financial interest to rule against one of the parties). Of
course, every judge has some biases, and we simply have to accept some of them.
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as the adversarial system itself, hinge on the idea that a judge acts as
an impartial decision-maker. 94 If, as the evidence suggests, our elected
state judges are not truly impartial, the implication for the rule of law
is troubling, to say the least.
So how can judicial impartiality be bolstered in the state courts?
For most legal academics, the best solution appears to be the elimina
tion of judicial elections. 95 In the colorful words of Roy Schotland,
"[M]ore sweat and ink have been spent on getting rid of judicial elec
tions than on any other single subject in the history of American
law."96 But judicial elections remain popular among the people, and it
seems highly unlikely that states will revert back to an appointive judi
ciary any time soon. 9 7
Drawing a line between proper and improper biases is a difficult, if not impossible,
exercise. But there are some biases that are clearly improper: relationship with one of
the parties, one of the parties holds the keys to the judge's job, debt, favors, or other
motivators. As Professor Leubsdorf explained in an influential article, "One can
scarcely advance the ideal of judicial impartiality without feeling doubts. We all take
it for granted that personal values and assumptions help shape every judge's deci
sions." John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 237-38 (1987). See also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudi
catory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455,
492 (1986) (acknowledging that reality of human nature "forces us to tolerate some
bias"). Justice Scalia's opinion in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White notes that
complete judicial impartiality, in the sense of the judicial mind as a "tabula rasa," is
neither required nor desired. 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002). The judge's experiences,
views, and upbringing may influence the judge's decision without running afoul of
due process. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE Jumc1AL PROCESS 168
( 1921) ("The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not tum aside
in their course, and pass the judges by.").
94. See Monroe Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1060, 1065 (1975) ("[The adversarial] system proceeds on the assumption that the
best way to ascertain the truth is to present to an impartial judge or jury a confronta
tion between the proponents of conflicting views, assigning to each the task of mar
shalling and presenting the evidence for its side in as thorough and persuasive a way
as possible.").
95. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter's
Perspective, 64 Omo ST. L.J. 13, 41 (2003) ("There is widespread dissatisfaction
today with the operation of judicial elections."); Geyh, supra note 90, at 72-79 (argu
ing for the elimination of judicial elections); Scott D. Wiener, Popular Justice: State
Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187,
212 (1996) (concluding that compliance with due process requires the elimination of
judicial elections). But see CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE
OF JumCIAL ELECTIONS (2009) (arguing in favor of judicial elections); Michael R.
Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting Judges-Except All the Others that Have
Been Tried, 32 N. Kv. L. REV. 267 (2005).
96. Roy A. Schotland, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 61 L. & CoN
TEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 (J 998).
97. Approximately eighty percent of the public favors judicial elections. See Geyh,
supra note 90, at 52-53.
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Some scholars have argued that judicial elections are not just
problematic but are also unconstitutional. The argument has been most
powerfully made by Professor Martin Redish, who has written that the
use of judicial elections violates due process. 98 While the argument
has some logical force, the Supreme Court has given no indication that
it would entertain such an idea. To the contrary, Justice Scalia's opin
ion in White strongly suggested that because judicial elections have
co-existed with the Due Process Clause for well over a century, any
arguments that judicial elections violate the due process guarantee of
impartiality are likely to fail. 99 Indeed, judicial elections have become
so engrained in the fabric of this nation that it is difficult to imagine
any court striking the institution down as a whole.
If elections are here to stay, then we are stuck with our current
approach to judicial bias. 100 That approach centers on recusal. As most
commonly formulated, if a judge is biased or if there is an appearance

98. Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with
State Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular
Constitutionalism, 56 WM. & MARYL. REV. I, 2 (2014); Redish & Marshall, supra
note 93, at 498 (finding that "the use of non-tenured state judges seems to be a clear
violation of procedural due process" in at least some cases).
99. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002) (explaining that
the dissenting justices' "election-nullifying" views are not "reflected in the Due Pro
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which has coexisted with the election of
judges ever since it was adopted").
JOO. There are, perhaps, two other alternatives. The first is to maintain judicial elec
tions, but eliminate the factors that contribute to judicial bias. For example, some
scholars have argued that rules for judicial elections should differ from the rules for
other elections because of the due process concerns for litigants that will eventually
argue before the elected judges. See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint
and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J.L. Eru1cs 1059, I 060 (1996). But in White,
the Supreme Court largely ignored that suggestion, opting instead for a unilocular "an
election is an election" approach. The Court's recent decision in Williams-Yulee, how
ever, slightly opens the door to such arguments and suggests that perhaps the Court
would allow some regulations of judicial elections that would be unconstitutional in
any other election. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (upholding
Florida's ban on personal solicitations of campaign funds by judicial candidates).
The second alternative is to implement some softer solutions: greater education
of the public about the judicial role, testing and education of judicial candidates about
bias, including, inter alia, unconscious and subconscious bias. See, e.g., Raymond J.
McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the Fundamental Value of Judicial
Ethics: Lessons from "Big Judge Davis," 99 KY. L.J. 259, 295-324 (2011) (sug
gesting such strategies). I, too, have written about creating a more informed electorate,
with the hope that this would lead judges to be less fearful about losing their jobs
based on individual unpopular decisions. See Dmitry Barn, Voter Ignorance and Judi
cial Elections, 102 Kv. L.J. 553 (2014). While I continue to believe these efforts are
important, such efforts permit the sources of bias to continue and are unlikely to be
entirely adequate.
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of bias, the judge must step aside. 101 This was not always the case.
Under British common law and at the time of the Founding, recusal
was required only when the judge had a financial stake in the outcome
of the case. 102 But Congress passed America's first recusal statute
early in this nation's history, and that statute has been revised and
expanded a number of times over the last 225 years. 103 Since then,
recusal has become the central feature of judicial ethics codes, 104 as
well as state recusal statutes. 105 In short, at both the state and federal
levels, recusal is our solution to the bias problem.
Scholars have clung to recusal as a potentially viable solution to
the problem of judicial bias. Some have argued that recusal is "the
only effective means to ensure the impartiality of elected judges" 106
and that "recusal reform offers an effective, constitutional means of
solving" the judicial bias problem that results from judicial elec
tions.107 In fact, recusal can arguably be "precisely targeted to
preventing due process problems . . . without restricting campaign
speech at all." 108 In the last decade, and especially since the Caperton
decision, recusal has been a frequent topic in law journals. 109
101. See, e.g., TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (2002). See generally
Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Re
form, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1151 (2011) (reviewing the recusal codes and statutes in
all fifty states).
102. Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 663
(2005) ("[H]istorically, the only basis for recusal was financial interest.").
103. See Dmitry Barn, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of
Bias, 2011 BYU L. REv. 943, 943 (discussing the evolution of the federal recusal
statutes).
104. See, e.g., CoNN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11 (2011); N.M. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 21-400 (2010).
105. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 51-39 (West 2015); LA. CODE Civ. PRoc.
ANN. art. 151 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1103 (2015).
106. Molly McLucas, The Need for Effective Recusal Standards for an Elected Judi
ciary, 42 Lav. LA. L. REv. 671, 692 (2009) (emphasis added).
107. David K. Stott, 'Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Im
partiality Through Recusal Reform, 2009 BYU L. REv. 481, 482; see also Grannis,
supra note 9, at 415 (explaining that recusal is "a manageable solution to the problem
of possible judicial bias").
I 08. Friedland, supra note 22, at 568-70.
109. See, e.g., James M. Anderson et al., Measuring How Stock Ownership Affects
Which Judges and Justices Hear Cases, 103 GEO. L.J. 1163 (2015); Debra Lyn Bas
sett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 97 lowAL. REv. 181
(2011); Kang & Shepherd, supra note 16; Patrick A. Woods, Reversal by Recusal?
Comer v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. and the Need for Mandatory Judicial Recusal
Statements, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 177 (2015). See generally Correy Stephenson, Legal
Ethics a Hot Topic in 2011, Wis. L.J. (Dec. 28, 2011, 10: 11 AM), http://wislawjour
nal.com/2011/12/28/legal-ethics-a-hot-topic-in-2011/.
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Judges, too, have suggested that recusal can be a remedy to the
election-related bias problem. In his White concurrence, Justice Ken
nedy endorsed more stringent recusal standards as one acceptable
means of preserving judicial impartiality. 110 In other words, to the ex
tent that judicial campaigning endorsed by the Court's decision in
White creates either bias or the appearance of bias, Justice Kennedy
explained that stricter recusal standards can eliminate that problem.
Lower court judges have echoed Kennedy's sentiment, 111 suggesting
that to the extent that judicial elections lead to judicial bias, the recusal
mechanism is in place to ensure that the case will be heard by an
impartial arbiter.
Then came Caperton, and once again the Supreme Court offered
recusal as the proposed remedy to judicial bias. Caperton held a great
deal of promise. Here was the Court-a majority this time-giving
some constitutional bite to recusal and perhaps even expanding the
meaning of due process. 112 As an indication of Caperton' s potential
impact, the dissent fretted that recusal would become too powerful a
tool in the hands of wily lawyers, who would abuse the recusal proce
dure for their advantage. 11 3
This focus on recusal is not surprising. Recusal has tremendous
allure because, in theory, it allows us to ensure judicial impartiality at
the point of delivery. If recusal works to remedy election-related judi
cial bias, then states can continue with the practice of judicial elec
tions and judicial candidates can have robust freedom of speech. Our
methods of judicial selection and pre-judicial experiences of American
judges do seem to require a post hoc remedy. Unlike judges through
out much of the rest of the world, American judges largely come from
practice. 114 Many are well-known lawyers and members of their com
110. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
111. See, e.g., Family Tr. Found. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 702 (E.D. Ky.
2004) (contending that judges whose impartiality could be questioned because of
campaign promises could be required to recuse themselves under the state code of
judicial conduct); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 763 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
112. Gerard J. Clark, Caperton 's New Right to Independence in Judges, 58 DRAKE L.
REV. 661, 661 (2010) ("In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the United States Su
preme Court expanded the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ...."
(citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009))).
113. In his Caperton dissent, Chief Justice Roberts predicted a flood of recusal mo
tions relying on the majority's reasoning. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 902 (Roberts, CJ.,
dissenting). As it turned out, however, Chief Justice Roberts's predictions have been
unfulfilled. See Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After
Caperton, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 229 (2010).
114. See generally BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE B1As IN THE AMERI
CAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2010).

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy

652

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18:631

munities, having established strong bonds with other lawyers and cli
ents in the community. 115 As a result, American judges are more
likely to come to the bench with biases and connections-even aside
from the electoral influences-that recusal can remedy. Or can it? We
tum to that question next.
III.
A

BROKEN PROMISE

Because our constitutional guarantee of judicial impartiality
hinges greatly on the success of the recusal statutes and ethical rules
regulating judicial disqualification, the critical question is this: can
recusal remedy the judicial bias problem? I believe the answer is no.
In this Article, I want to highlight two potential reasons. The first is
the self-recusal procedure that is followed in most states. The second
is that recusal simply does not work when it comes to fixing systemic
bias stemming from the election process.
A.

Self-Recusal Procedure

One major reason why recusal has failed is the self-recusal proce
dure. In most states, as in the federal courts, judges decide their own
recusal motions. 116 This recusal procedure has been followed through
out the United States since the time of the Founding and was followed
in England for centuries before that. 117 While there are some excep
tions, the judge's decision usually is final, subject only to appellate
review. That appellate review, however, is generally highly deferential
to the judge's decision, and reversals are rare. 11 8
This self-recusal procedure is particularly inappropriate when it
comes to addressing election-related judicial bias for several reasons.
First, in the course of their campaigns, candidates for judicial office
make all sorts of statements, announcements, and promises. 119 In the
next election, voters are likely to expect the judge to have some record
as to the category of cases where the judge made promises before. As
115. Id.
116. Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their Impartiality Might
Reasonably Be Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 411,
448 (2014).
117. See John A. Meiser, The (Non)problem of a Limited Due Process Right to Judi
cial Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1799, 1803 (2009) ("[O]ur recusal
procedures grew out of English common law practice.").
118. Jon P. McClanahan, Safeguarding the Propriety of the Judiciary, 91 N.C. L.
REv. 1951, 1990 (2013) (observing that "self-recusal decisions are reviewed deferen
tially and rarely reversed on appeal").
119. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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a result, we might expect judges to hesitate before disqualifying them
selves from cases involving issues about which they had campaigned
(and, presumably, the issues that voters care about most). 120 Judges
who recuse themselves in cases that the voters care about most might
find themselves out of a job.12 1
The second reason why the self-recusal procedure is ill-suited to
addressing election-related judicial bias is that judges might feel that
recusing themselves for their campaign statements and conduct would
imply that the campaigning itself had been improper. 122 In addition,
the ethics codes require judges to recuse sua sponte, meaning that
recusal motions put judges in a difficult spot: "a successful motion to
recuse requires the [judge] to admit that he failed in the first instance
to adhere to statutory and ethical requirements." 123 Even an unbiased
judge may worry that a recusal sends a message that he is biased. 124
Third, the self-recusal procedure is least effective particularly
when it is needed most. Take, for example, the situation where a judge
is biased in favor of a contributor to the judge's previous election. 125
120. See James Layman, Judicial Campaign Speech Regulation: Integrity or Incen
tives?, 19 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 769, 775 (2006) ("[l]f a judge is required to recuse
himself on all issues related to his campaign promises, 'the voters do not get what
they believe they were promised.'"). While there have been few studies of voter ex
pectations in judicial elections, studies of candidates running for office in other elec
tions suggest that those candidates expect voters to evaluate them based on their
record in office. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE Lorne OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
72-76 (1990) (arguing that voters evaluate the probability that a candidate will choose
a voter-preferred policy based on an evaluation of the candidate's records).
121. In fact, some have argued that requiring recusal under these circumstances un
dermines the purpose of judicial elections. Why have elections, the argument goes, if
any substantive information that a candidate can provide to a voter about what they
would do when in office disables the judge from doing what she promised? According
to some scholars, providing voters with information about a judge, and then requiring
the judge who provided the information to recuse from those cases, "work[s] a fraud
on the voters." Shepard, supra note I 00, at 1076; see also Penny J. White, A Matter of
Perspective, 3 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 5, 63-75 (2004) (arguing that mandatory
recusal rules might run afoul of First Amendment); Michael Zuckerman, Judicial
Recusal and Expanding Notions of Due Process, 13 U. PA. J. CoNST. L. 977, 1013
(20 I I) ("If recusal burdens speech, then affording too much weight to a litigant's due
process rights may infringe upon the presiding judge's right to speak outside the
courtroom, including on the campaign trail, thus harming the marketplace of ideas.").
122. This is similar to the rules problem of a judge who failed to recuse sua sponte.
123. R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck Recuse?: Foreign Common law Gui
dance and Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1799, 1833-34 (2005).
124. James Sample & David E. Pozen, Making Judicial Recusal More Rigorous,
JuDGils' J., Winter 2007, at 17, 20.
125. Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L.
REv. 699, 699 (1995) ("Ordinary rules of social interaction impose obligations of
gratitude and loyalty on those who receive a significant benefit.").
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Recusal eliminates the judge's ability to repay his debt of gratitude. 126
And if a judge does recuse in every case involving that contributor,
that contributor is likely to take his money elsewhere. As a result, the
more biased the target judge is, the less likely that judge is to recuse
himself. 127 In fact, in a New York Times study of judicial voting in the
Supreme Court of Ohio, the Times found that in "the 215 cases with
the most direct potential conflicts of interest, justices recused them
selves just 9 times."12s
Moreover, judges rarely recognize their own biases, or even the
appearance of bias, because such bias is often subconscious. 129
Caperton's Justice Benjamin, for example, was convinced that he was
not biased, and presumably, since he did not recuse, that no one could
perceive him as biased. 130 Modem research in cognitive psychology
tells us why 131 : the cognitive biases that affect judicial decisions make
it impossible for judges to assess their own conduct dispassionately
and open-mindedly. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as the
"bias blind spot." 132 Everyone, including a judge, makes decisions in a
manner skewed to favor their own self-interest and to view themselves

126. In Caperton, the Supreme Court emphasized the debt of gratitude that Justice
Benjamin owed to Don Blankenship as one of the reasons recusal was required under
the Due Process Clause. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 882
(2009).
127. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 72.
128. Liptak & Roberts, supra note 42.
129. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1317, 1333
(2006) ("Because so many biases operate on subconscious levels, it is often difficult
for individuals to gauge the factors that may skew judgment."). The work of Jeffrey
Rachlinkski, Andrew Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie has demonstrated that judges suffer
from similar unconscious biases as the general population. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et
al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1195 (2009).
130. Melinda A. Marbes, Refocusing Recusals: How the Bias Blind Spot Affects Dis
qualification Disputes and Should Reshape Recusal Reform, 32 ST. LoUis U. PuB. L.
REv. 235, 276 (2013) ("Justice Benjamin did what most of us do when evaluating our
own biases-he succumbed to the Introspection Illusion, which confirmed his belief
that he was not biased in this specific instance."); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Impeach Brent
Benjamin Now!?: Giving Adequate Attention to Failings of Judicial Impartiality, 47
SAN Dmoo L. REV. I, 55 (2010) (discussing the standards applied and conclusions
reached by Justice Benjamin).
131. Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a
Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REv.
913 (1999) (discussing unconscious bias); see also Robert A. Prentice, The Case of
the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw.
U. L. REV. 133, 143-80 (2000) (discussing self-serving bias).
132. Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus
Others, 28 PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. Buu,. 369, 370 (2002).
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in the best light. 133 As a result of this tendency, people tend to think
they are better than they actually are at a number of different tasks and
on a number of different criteria, including fairness and ethics. 134 Spe
cifically for purposes of this Article, judges overestimate their ability
to remain impartial, ignoring the evidence of judicial bias. 135
Making matters worse is that judges do not react well to requests
for recusal. Many judges take offense when recusal motions are filed
against them. 136 Michigan's experience with amending its recusal
rules offers interesting insight. In 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court
responded to Caperton by amending its court rules to permit the entire
court to hear a party's disqualification motion if the challenged judge
denied the motion in the first instance. 137 In a bitter dissent from the
court's announcement of the procedural change, Justice Corrigan, on
behalf of three justices, accused the four-justice majority of curtailing
the fundamental freedoms of state judges and "depriv[ing] their co
equal peers of their constitutionally protected interest in hearing
cases." 138 This territoriality and personal pride is part of the reason
why litigants are afraid of bringing recusal motions, and can lead a
judge to extract vengeance on the moving litigant. 139
And while shifting the recusal decision to another judge may fix
the constitutional objections to the self-recusal procedure, such a shift
is unlikely to be a panacea. Judges generally like each other and hesi
133. See Ward Farnsworth, The legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DA
v1s L. REV. 567, 570 (2003).
134. David Messick et al., Why We Are Fairer than Others, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PsvcHOL. 480 (1985).
135. See Chris Guthrie et al., The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination of
Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1519-20 (2009). Interestingly, judges
are able to identify this bias in their colleagues but not in themselves. Most judges
simply see themselves as "above average." Guthrie et al., supra note 72, at 814-15.
136. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some Jus
tices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH1cs 375, 392 (2003) ("The case law is
filled with descriptions of defensive and angry judges denying motions that they re
cuse themselves.").
137. M1cH. CT. R. 2.003(D)(3)(b). Prior to the change, the Michigan Supreme
Court's recusal procedure was identical to that of the United States Supreme Court
and that of nearly all the other state supreme courts. That is, each justice was in charge
of his or her own recusal motion, without any oversight by his or her colleagues. See
Jonathan Blitzer, Recusal Reform in Michigan, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JusT. (July 31,
2009), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/recusal-reform-michigan.
138. Pelligrino v. Ampco Sys. Parking, 789 N.W.2d 777, 814 (Mich. 2010) (Corri
gan, J., dissenting).
139. Neumann, supra note 136, at 392 ("The case law is filled with descriptions of
defensive and angry judges denying motions that they recuse themselves."); Sample &
Pozen, supra note 124, at 17, 19 ("[L]itigants may be afraid of bringing recusal mo
tions for fear of angering their judge.").
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tate to impugn each others' ability to remain impartial. 14° Further
more, no third party can decide whether another judge is actually
biased without a true adversarial process in which both sides present
evidence of the judge's state of mind. Recusal is a dispute between a
judge and a litigant, and an adversarial process that allows those two
sides to present their dispute to a neutral third party would be cumber
some and inefficient. 14 1
Of course, in Caperton itself the Supreme Court stepped in, al
lowing us to hold this symposium. But the Court's involvement is
unusual. It hears only eighty cases every year, so there is generally
little to no oversight of state court decisions, let alone state court
recusal decisions. This means that every time a Caperton issue
arises-and it arises almost every day in courtrooms throughout the
country 142-it will likely be resolved by the very judge whose recusal
is being sought. And the result is not likely to be any different from
the result reached by Justice Benjamin.
B.

Recusal at the Wholesale Level

Admittedly, in some circumstances, recusal works well. For ex
ample, recusal is perfectly suited for a situation where we can identify
a specific source of bias that a particular judge suffers from. If the
source of bias is unique to the judge in question-perhaps the judge
owns stock in one of the companies, or the judge is friendly with one
of the parties, or the judge has personal knowledge of the facts of the
case-then recusal is a perfect fit. 143 The sources of bias are objec
tively identifiable, and other judges who do not suffer from the same
bias may be found. Removing the biased judge from the case elimi
nates the bias entirely .144 Moreover, a targeted prophylactic rule may
140. Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts,
87 IowA L. REv. 1213, 1237 (2002) (discussing the "resistance of other appellate
judges to the idea of evaluating allegations of bias or prejudice against their col
leagues"); Note, Disqualification of a Federal District Judge for Bias: The Standard
Under Section 144, 57 MINN. L. REV. 749, 767 (1973) ("Many courts are understand
ably reluctant to disqualify a fellow judge since a finding of actual prejudice . . .
impugns both that judge's qualifications and those of the system he represents.").
141. Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Proce
dural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REv. 107, 171 (2004) (discuss
ing the efficiency concerns of third-party review of recusal decisions).
142. Id.
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2013) (listing specific circumstances when judicial dis
qualification is required).
144. For example, under§ 455(b), a judge must recuse if he has "personal knowl
edge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." Replacing that judge
with one who does not have such "personal knowledge" alleviates the problem
entirely.
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prevent the biased judge from taking personal offense to a recusal mo
tion, or can make recusal motions unnecessary since the grounds for
recusal are objectively identifiable to any reasonable jurist.
But for election-related bias, things are not so simple. The
majoritarian difficulty affects every state judge who must run for re
election. No judge is safe from the threat of losing the next election.
Every judge must consider how her decisions will be characterized in
the next election cycle or how potential contributors would react to the
decision. And for this kind of bias, recusal is inadequate. Removing
one judge who feels pressure to tailor her rulings toward a potential
reelection bid and replacing her with another judge who feels identical
pressure does little to ensure judicial impartiality. The case must still
be heard by a judge-there is simply no way to get around that re
quirement-and every judge will suffer from the same job-security
biases. The majoritarian difficulty applies to all elected judges, not
just those who received campaign contributions.
In short, current recusal rules leave judges essentially immune
from punishment for acting in a biased manner, 145 and when it comes
to election-related judicial bias, recusal seems to be an inadequate so
lution. And as judicial elections become more and more competitive
and expensive, the bias problem will become worse and worse. 146
CONCLUSION

With every new study showing that elected judges are biased
along a number of dimensions, the search for a solution gains addi
tional urgency. Assuming judicial elections are here to stay and reform
of judicial elections is forestalled by the Supreme Court's interpreta
tion of the First Amendment, scholars must find new solutions to the
problem of judicial bias. If judges are unable to check their own biases
through recusal, then somebody else must act as such a check. The
best recommendation so far has come from Amanda Frost and
Stefanie Lindquist. 147 They suggest that the federal courts may be able
to serve as a partial check on election-related judicial bias. This, of
course, is true when it comes to questions of federal law, in particular
constitutional rights. But that is an incomplete check. Most state law
145. I am not suggesting that a draconian check is necessary. Cf. M.H. Hoeflich,
Regulation of Judicial Misconduct from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 L.
& HlsT. REv. 79, 82 (1984) (discussing the approaches adopted throughout Europe in
the seventh and eighth centuries, including liability to the aggrieved party-and some
times even the crown-on judges who decided cases as a result of favoritism to the
other party).
146. See Pozen, supra note 12 (discussing this irony).
147. Frost & Lindquist, supra note 23.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy

658

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18:631

decisions never reach the federal judiciary, either because of lack of
resources or because they do not involve issues of federal law. The
biases discussed in this Article take place in state trial courts. They are
seen in the way that the courts decide summary judgment motions,
motions to dismiss, and motions as a matter of law. Bias might per
vade the awarding of damages in a bench trial, or ruling on objections
in trial, or sentencing criminal defendants for violating state criminal
law. In short, while turning to the federal courts as a check is a crea
tive answer, it is woefully incomplete.
Five years ago, Caperton was celebrated as an important victory
for judicial impartiality. The Due Process Clause would stand as a
check on judicial bias to ensure that election-related bias would not
influence judicial decisions. But I am convinced that recusal is not the
answer, and replacing one elected judge with another using the dis
qualification procedure will not suffice.
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